HR 1215119th CongressIn Committee

Semiconductor Supply Chain Security and Diversification Act of 2025

Introduced: Feb 11, 2025

Standard Summary

Comprehensive overview in 1-2 paragraphs

The Semiconductor Supply Chain Security and Diversification Act of 2025 (H.R. 1215) would direct U.S. policy and resources toward helping Western Hemisphere countries broaden and diversify both their upstream and downstream semiconductor supply chains. Upstream is defined to include mining, production, or processing of key minerals used in semiconductors (such as zinc, gallium, germanium, silicon, lithium, and cobalt). Downstream covers testing and packaging facilities for semiconductors, including advanced testing and packaging. The bill envisions creating regionally-based semiconductor ecosystems in the Western Hemisphere to complement U.S. CHIPS Act investments, promote secure and diverse supply chains, and strengthen regional cooperation with organizations like the Organization of American States (OAS). It would authorize the United States International Development Finance Corporation (DFC) to fund relevant projects in Western Hemisphere economies with certain conditions and waivers from some current investment restrictions, provided the President certifies alignment with U.S. interests and developmental benefits, or strategic considerations against competitors. The bill also directs U.S. diplomacy and interagency coordination (primarily through the State Department and the Department of Commerce) to support cross-border infrastructure negotiations, improve regulatory environments, and foster accessible and competitive supply chain markets across the region. It sets forth oversight and eligibility rules for DFC-backed projects, including a waiver of certain BUILD Act restrictions and certification requirements tied to U.S. national interests and developmental outcomes, especially for poorer populations or to counter strategic competitors. The aim is to align Western Hemisphere investments with U.S. national security and economic goals while expanding regional semiconductor capacity.

Key Points

1Upstream and downstream definitions:
2- Upstream includes mining, production, or processing of critical minerals used in semiconductor manufacturing (e.g., zinc, gallium, germanium, silicon, lithium, cobalt).
3- Downstream includes testing and packaging facilities for semiconductors, including advanced testing/packaging.
4Sense of Congress and policy goals:
5- The United States has an interest in diversifying the semiconductor supply chain by fostering regionally based ecosystems in the Western Hemisphere to complement U.S. CHIPS Act investments.
6- Policy aims to promote secure, accessible, transparent, competitive semiconductor markets with diversified sources, types, and routes.
7Role of U.S. diplomacy and interagency coordination:
8- The Secretary of State, in consultation with the Secretary of Commerce and other agencies, would focus efforts on supporting Western Hemisphere governments to diversify upstream and downstream supply chains.
9- Activities include diplomacy with the OAS and regional governments to facilitate cross-border infrastructure, improve regulatory environments, and develop competitive supply chains sourced from diverse origins.
10Support for Western Hemisphere projects (DFC and eligibility):
11- DFC may fund upstream and downstream projects in Western Hemisphere countries with upper-middle-income or high-income status (per World Bank classifications).
12- Restrictions under the BUILD Act section 1412(c)(2) would not apply to these projects (i.e., certain existing restrictions would be waived for this purpose).
13Certification and oversight requirements:
14- DFC support must be restricted unless the President certifies to appropriate congressional committees that the support furthers U.S. economic or foreign policy interests.
15- Projects must provide significant developmental benefits to the poorest populations or be necessary to counter or preempt efforts by a strategic competitor seeking leverage or to acquire national security-sensitive technologies or infrastructure in a U.S. ally/partner country.
16Appropriate congressional committees:
17- The bill references the same committees defined for the BUILD Act (i.e., as interpreted in that act) for oversight and input.

Impact Areas

Primary:- Western Hemisphere governments and economies (including Latin American countries with upper-middle or high-income status) and their semiconductor-related infrastructure.- United States policymakers and the U.S. semiconductor supply chain, via diplomacy, investment, and market integration efforts.- U.S. agencies involved (State Department, Department of Commerce) and the U.S. International Development Finance Corporation (DFC).Secondary:- Upstream mineral producers (e.g., mines for zinc, gallium, germanium, silicon, lithium, cobalt) and downstream semiconductor testing/packaging providers in the Western Hemisphere.- Regional trade and infrastructure development efforts, potentially affecting cross-border energy and materials corridors and regulatory regimes.Additional impacts:- National security: aims to reduce reliance on single-region supply chains and counter strategic competitors’ influence.- Economic development: potential developmental benefits for poorer populations within beneficiary countries, and broader regional market integration.- Regulatory and governance: possible changes in regional regulatory environments to accommodate more open and diversified semiconductor markets.- Oversight and accountability: reliance on presidential certification and congressional oversight to ensure alignment with U.S. interests and developmental goals.

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