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S 2362119th CongressIn Committee

Ending Lending to China Act of 2025

Introduced: Jul 21, 2025
Defense & National Security
Standard Summary
Comprehensive overview in 1-2 paragraphs

The Ending Lending to China Act of 2025 would formalize U.S. policy to oppose any further lending or technical assistance from multilateral development banks (MDBs) to the People’s Republic of China once China graduates from eligibility for such financing. It directs the Secretary of the Treasury to have the U.S. Executive Director at each MDB use the United States’ voice, vote, and influence to oppose new loans or assistance to China and to end lending to any country that exceeds the MDBs’ graduation income thresholds. The bill also requires annual (and then ongoing) reporting on China’s borrowing from MDBs, the composition of each bank’s governance with respect to China, which countries have exceeded or graduated from eligibility, and what the United States is doing to promote graduation. In short, it seeks to cut off new MDB financing to China and to systematically document and push for graduation from eligibility.

Key Points

  • 1Oppose further MDB lending to China: The bill states the U.S. policy is to oppose any new loan or technical/financial assistance to the PRC from MDBs (e.g., World Bank’s IBRD and the Asian Development Bank) on the basis of China’s graduation from eligibility.
  • 2Directs U.S. participation at MDBs: The Secretary of the Treasury must instruct the U.S. Executive Directors at each MDB to use the United States’ voice and votes to oppose such lending and to end lending to countries that exceed the graduation income threshold.
  • 3Graduation threshold and rationale: Uses the MDBs’ graduation discussion income as the benchmark for ending eligibility. China is noted as having exceeded this threshold since 2016, which the bill uses to justify halting further lending.
  • 4Annual reporting requirement: Within one year of enactment and annually thereafter, the Treasury must report on (1) China’s borrowing status at each MDB, (2) China’s voting power and representation at each bank, (3) which countries exceed the graduation income threshold, (4) which countries have graduated, and (5) U.S. efforts to graduate countries that exceed the threshold.
  • 5Definitions and scope: Defines “multilateral development banks” consistent with the International Financial Institutions Act and specifies which congressional committees have oversight. It clarifies who counts as the “appropriate congressional committees” for reporting.

Impact Areas

Primary: United States influence over MDB lending to China; China’s access to MDB financing could be significantly restricted, potentially accelerating China’s shift toward alternative financing sources or its own institutions.Secondary: Recipient countries that rely on MDB loans for infrastructure and development could face reduced access to concessional or blended financing if MDBs tighten lending to China and adjust their global portfolios; could alter the competitive dynamic with China-led lenders (e.g., AIIB, NDB) and other regional development banks.Additional impacts: Heightened U.S.–China policy tension in multilateral forums; potential shifts in global development finance strategies as MDBs respond to U.S. direction; implications for the governance and voting power balance within MDBs if China’s influence declines or if reform proposals accompany increased U.S. influence. The act does not itself provide funding or create new loan programs; it changes voting behavior and reporting to push current policy through existing MDBs.
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