S 2342119th CongressIn Committee

Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2026

Introduced: Jul 17, 2025

Defense & National Security

Standard Summary

Comprehensive overview in 1-2 paragraphs

The Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2026 would authorize and structure funding for the United States intelligence community for FY2026, covering intelligence and intelligence-related activities, the Intelligence Community Management Account, and the Central Intelligence Agency Retirement and Disability System. Beyond funding, the bill also implements a number of policy and governance reforms across the Intelligence Community (IC). Notable provisions include new authorities to protect CIA facilities from unmanned aircraft, a statutory offense for unauthorized access to IC property, expanded acquisition and contracting flexibilities, and requirements for annual analyses of analytic objectivity and standards. The bill also codifies and broadens several governance and oversight mechanisms intended to increase accountability, transparency (to a controlled extent), and jointness in modernization efforts. In addition to the funding and direct IC function provisions, the bill lays out numerous policy areas across foreign affairs, emerging technologies, classification and security clearances, whistleblower protections, and other matters. While many of these provisions are substantive and technical, the overarching aim is to strengthen national security capabilities, tighten oversight and accountability, and promote coordinated modernization and resilience across the IC, while attempting to balance privacy and civil liberties protections. Sponsor and status: Introduced in the Senate (S. 2342) and reported by the Select Committee on Intelligence; sponsor is identified as Mr. Cotton. The bill includes a comprehensive set of titles and sections, but the text provided here covers only portions of Title I through Title III and select provisions; additional sections are listed but not fully excerpted in the material provided.

Key Points

11) Authorization of FY2026 IC funding and budget transparency mechanics
2- The bill authorizes appropriations for FY2026 for intelligence and intelligence-related activities, and for the CIA Retirement and Disability Fund. It also requires a classified Schedule of Authorizations to accompany the Act, with access limited to appropriate committees and the President, and restricted public disclosure.
32) New unauthorized-access crime for intelligence community property
4- Section 1115 (added to the National Security Act of 1947) creates a specific unlawful entry offense for entering IC property that is clearly marked as closed or restricted, with escalating penalties for first, second, and subsequent offenses.
53) CIA facility and asset protection from unmanned aircraft (UAS/UAV)
6- Section 15A adds a new mechanism within the CIA Act to protect CIA facilities/assets from UAS threats. Key elements include:
7- Definitions of covered facilities/assets and the involved agencies (including oversight by congressional intelligence committees and certain House/Senate committees).
8- The Director may take actions to detect, identify, monitor, intercept, warn, disrupt, seize, or destroy unmanned aircraft posing a credible threat, in coordination with the Secretary of Transportation and the FAA.
9- Privacy protections and limitations on data retention (generally 180-day retention unless justified by law or investigation).
10- Budget displays (unclassified with possible classified annex) and periodic briefings to Congress (semiannual, joint with the Secretary of Transportation).
11- Regulatory guidance and coordination with the FAA to avoid disruption of civil aviation.
12- Authorization for forfeiture of seized unmanned aircraft.
13- Notification requirements within 30 days of deploying new technology, with transparency on mitigations.
14- Termination date tied to a specified point in current DHS authorities, and explicit scope limits on the authority.
154) Modernization and acquisition authorities
16- Section 303 modifies acquisition authorities, including:
17- Adjustments to certain Other Transaction Authority (OTA) limits for NSA and NRO, higher thresholds for critical cases, and pre-approval/notification requirements to congressional intelligence committees.
18- Explicit allowance for follow-on production contracts under the director’s authority (with statutory guardrails).
19- A definition adjustment so that the term “major system” may exclude software programs, broadening how software is treated in procurement/major-system contexts.
205) Jointness and effectiveness in systems modernization
21- Section 304 requires the Under Secretary of Defense for Intelligence and Security to develop two modernization strategies (short-term and long-term) for the Distributed Common Ground System (DCGS) or its successor, ensuring input from military departments, combatant commands, and joint commands. It also requires the strategies to address new requirements, investment plans, replacement of service-managed components, and interoperability improvements, with copies provided to appropriate congressional committees.
226) Analytic objectivity and standards
23- Section 305 mandates annual surveys of analytic objectivity across IC elements, with reporting to congressional intelligence committees. It lists the IC components covered (e.g., NSA, DIA, NGA, IC elements within the military services, FBI Directorate of Intelligence, DOE, State, DHS, and Treasury intelligence units) and requires findings on perceived bias, which products are most affected, and whether issues were shared with analytic ombudsmen.
24- Section 306 (as referenced) deals with an annual training requirement and a report regarding analytic standards, building on prior NDAA authorities to raise analytic quality across IC components.
257) Broad governance and oversight landscape (titles and topics)
26- The bill enumerates additional titles and topics covering a wide array of IC governance, foreign policy and security matters, emerging technologies, classification reform, whistleblower protections, anomalous health incidents, and other security-related matters. These provisions collectively signal intent to reorganize or reform IC structures, tighten oversight, address ethics and civil liberties concerns, and address strategic competition with foreign actors (notably China and Russia), cyber and space threats, and technology standards.

Impact Areas

Primary group/area affected- U.S. intelligence community employees and contractors, and the agencies and components within the IC (e.g., NSA, DIA, NGA, CIA, DHS-ODI, DOE-OI, State, Treasury, etc.), as well as the Office of the Director of National Intelligence and related oversight bodies.- Congressional oversight committees (Senate and House intelligence and appropriations committees) that receive classified and unclassified budget data, periodic briefings, and routine reporting.Secondary group/area affected- Individuals and organizations operating at or around IC facilities, especially those near high-risk sites identified for unmanned aircraft threats.- Transportation regulators (FAA) and the Department of Transportation, due to required coordination on unmanned aircraft threats and mitigations.- Taxpayer and civil-liberties stakeholders, given privacy protections and oversight mechanisms embedded in UAS countermeasures and in analytic objectivity reporting.Additional impacts- Enhanced authority to deploy counter-UAS measures could affect airspace management, aviation safety, and airport operations, requiring careful coordination with FAA to avoid disruption.- Changes to acquisition authorities may affect how the IC engages in research, development, and procurement, including faster adoption of new technologies through OTAs and follow-on contracts, balanced by increased committee notifications and budget scrutiny.- Increased emphasis on analytic objectivity and training standards could influence how intelligence products are developed, reviewed, and validated, with potential effects on personnel training, ombudsman processes, and internal review mechanisms.- A broad set of foreign-policy and emerging-technology provisions indicates ongoing alignment with strategic competition concerns (e.g., China and Russia), with potential impacts on international cooperation, intelligence-sharing policies, and technology governance.

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