Cell-Site Simulator Warrant Act of 2025
The Cell-Site Simulator Warrant Act of 2025 would add a new section (18 U.S.C. 3119) prohibiting the use of cell-site simulators (also known as “Stingrays” or devices that imitate cell towers to locate or intercept mobile devices) except under tightly defined circumstances. In general, it would ban use of these devices within the United States and outside the United States by U.S. personnel for U.S. targets, with several narrow exceptions. The bill creates a strong framework of warrants, emergency authorities, minimization requirements, disclosure duties, and oversight to limit privacy intrusions and ensure accountability. It would also amend the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act (FISA) to align and constrain cell-site-simulator use in foreign and national security contexts, expand reporting requirements through inspectors general, and require certain technical and procedural disclosures in warrants and orders. Overall, the bill aims to curb government use of cell-site simulators, compel judicial oversight, minimize collateral privacy impacts, and increase transparency and accountability. Key features include a broad prohibition with listed exceptions, detailed warrant standards (including limitations on duration and geographic scope), emergency-use provisions with rapid post-use warrant requirements, minimization and publication of procedures, mandatory disclosure to defendants, civil remedies for unlawful use, and substantial reporting and oversight by IGs. It significantly strengthens privacy protections while preserving limited, regulated use for law enforcement, protective services, certain research, and specific foreign-intelligence and national-security contexts, subject to FISA procedures and FCC regulations.
Key Points
- 1Prohibition and exceptions for cell-site simulators
- 2- It shall be unlawful to knowingly use a cell-site simulator in the U.S. (and certain use abroad) except as specifically allowed by the act. There are defined exceptions for warrants, emergency use, protective services, research, contraband interdiction in correctional facilities, and certain testing/training.
- 3Warrant standards and procedures
- 4- For any warrant-based use, law enforcement must meet rigorous requirements: showing necessity after other methods have failed or are unlikely/dangerous; specifying the area and time of operation; ensuring the area and duration are as narrow as possible; and complying with Communications Act and FCC rules. Warrants cannot exceed 30 days initially, with possible extensions limited to another 30 days. Warrant applications must include detailed minimization and impact considerations on bystanders and services.
- 5Emergency use and post-use oversight
- 6- An emergency exception allows use if there is immediate danger or national-security threats, with rapid post-use warrant application (within 48 hours in many cases) and strict termination when information is obtained or the warrant is denied. Emergency uses require inventory and destruction rules if a warrant is denied.
- 7Minimization, disclosures, and notice
- 8- The Attorney General must publish minimization procedures to limit collection, retention, and dissemination of information about non-targets. Agencies must minimize and/or destroy non-target information and provide a government-wide notice and detailed inventory to affected individuals within specified timeframes (with possible court-approved delays).
- 9Evidence suppression and civil remedies
- 10- Information obtained in violation of the act is generally inadmissible as evidence, with narrowly defined exceptions for enforcing the act. Individuals can bring civil actions for unlawful use, including damages and attorney fees.
- 11FISA amendments and conformity
- 12- The act would add a cell-site-simulator definition to FISA and impose new requirements for FISA orders and applications when cell-site simulators are to be used in foreign intelligence or national-security contexts, including disclosures and minimization requirements akin to those in the 18 U.S.C. provisions. It also introduces conforming amendments to related FISA sections.
- 13Scope and definitions; enforcement and oversight
- 14- The bill defines key terms (cell-site simulator, advanced communications services, United States person, derived information, etc.) and requires annual Inspector General reports from DOJ, DHS, DOD, and the Intelligence Community on compliance, use, and outcomes, with unclassified versions publicly accessible.