S 2522119th CongressIn Committee

Cell-Site Simulator Warrant Act of 2025

Introduced: Jul 29, 2025

Sponsor: Sen. Wyden, Ron [D-OR] (D-Oregon)

Civil Rights & JusticeTechnology & Innovation

Standard Summary

Comprehensive overview in 1-2 paragraphs

The Cell-Site Simulator Warrant Act of 2025 would regulate the use of cell-site simulators (also known as “stingrays”) by law enforcement and intelligence agencies. The bill largely bans use of these devices in the United States unless a court has issued a warrant (with several strict requirements) and tightly limits how, where, and for how long surveillance can occur. It creates strong minimization and disclosure obligations to protect non-targets, requires periodic reporting by federal inspectors general, and adds cell-site simulator rules to the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act (FISA). There are a handful of narrow exceptions (e.g., protective services, research, testing/training, contraband interdiction in prisons, and certain emergency uses) and explicit limits on using these devices outside the United States. If violations occur, the bill imposes penalties and provides for civil action and potential disciplinary action. In short, the bill would significantly tighten oversight, transparency, and privacy protections around cell-site simulator deployments, while still allowing targeted uses under judicial authorization and a few defined exceptions.

Key Points

1Prohibition with narrowly defined exceptions: It is unlawful to knowingly use a cell-site simulator in the U.S. without a warrant (and certain limited emergency scenarios), and the intelligence community cannot use such devices on U.S. persons outside the United States. The rules also include a cautious rule of construction ensuring no broad extraterritorial authority outside the U.S.
2Warrant framework and time limits: When a warrant is allowed, the court must be convinced other investigative methods have failed or are unlikely/dangerous, specify the area and time of operation, ensure the area is narrowly tailored, and confirm compliance with communications laws and FCC rules. Initial warrants are limited to 30 days, with extensions also capped at 30 days, and each warrant/extension must terminate promptly once the objective is met.
3Minimization, disclosure, and notice: The Attorney General must adopt procedures to minimize data about non-targets, publish these procedures publicly, and destroy or limit the use of data about non-subjects. The bill requires disclosures in the warrant application about disruptions to emergency services, third-party testing, methods to minimize disruptions, and whether the operation will affect gatherings with protected activity. An inventory must be provided to affected individuals within 90 days after denial or termination, with possible delay for good cause.
4Evidence rules and civil remedies: Information obtained in violation is generally not admissible as evidence, with an exception for enforcing the alleged violation itself. Individuals harmed by unlawful operation can bring civil actions for relief, including damages and attorney's fees.
5Broad exceptions and special uses: There are several carve-outs, including for protective services, contraband interdiction in correctional facilities (with specific guardrails and FCC compliance), research/training by non-governmental users, and FCC testing. A separate emergency-use pathway allows limited use if there is imminent danger and the warrant could not be obtained quickly, with rapid post-use reporting and destruction if a warrant is denied.
6IG oversight and reporting: Inspector Generals from DOJ, DHS, DOD, and the IC must annually report to Congress on compliance, warrants granted/denied, emergency uses, targeted devices, and data about non-targets, with unclassified versions posted publicly.
7FISA and technical alignment: The Act adds cell-site simulator definitions into FISA and tightens FISA-related orders, including disclosures and minimization requirements related to cell-site simulator use. It also updates related statutory language to align with the new 18 U.S.C. section and to ensure compatibility with federal and state rules.
8Definitions: The bill provides specific terms (e.g., “cell-site simulator,” “advanced communications services,” “United States person,” “minimization”) to avoid ambiguity and ensure consistent interpretation across statutes.

Impact Areas

Primary group/area affected- Individuals’ privacy and civil liberties: The new warrant framework, minimization requirements, and mandatory disclosures are designed to limit incidental collection and protect non-targets, potentially reducing overbroad surveillance.Secondary group/area affected- Law enforcement and the intelligence community: Agencies would face new procedural hurdles, longer decision points for approvals, and heightened oversight. Warrant-based use and emergency pathways could affect how quickly cases are pursued.Additional impacts- Courts and prosecutors: New standards for warrants, extensions, and evidence handling will shape how cell-site simulator cases are reviewed and prosecuted.- Civil society and privacy advocates: The act increases transparency and provides avenues for civil action, potentially increasing accountability for improper uses.- Telecommunication and technology sectors: With stricter disclosure and minimization requirements and FCC-aligned operations, agencies may need additional technical and compliance capabilities.- Correctional facilities: The contraband interdiction carve-out offers a regulated pathway for prison settings, including compliance and reporting duties.- National security considerations: The FISA-related provisions create tighter alignment between domestic criminal surveillance and foreign intelligence purposes, aiming to safeguard against unchecked data collection on U.S. persons.

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