Fed Integrity and Independence Act of 2025
The Fed Integrity and Independence Act of 2025 would amend the Federal Reserve Act to prohibit dual appointments of any Federal Reserve System employee. In practical terms, no one serving on the Fed’s Board of Governors, as a president/vice president/officer/employee of a Federal Reserve Bank, or as a member of a Federal Reserve Bank’s board of directors may simultaneously hold any other office, position, or employment in which they are appointed by the President (including while on a leave of absence). The bill also includes a formal “Sense of Congress” statement underscoring the Fed’s independence from political interference and the importance of avoiding conflicts of interest or undue influence. The changes target three specific statutory provisions to ensure that presidentially appointed Fed officials cannot have concurrent presidential appointments.
Key Points
- 1Prohibits dual presidential appointments for all Federal Reserve System personnel covered by the act (Board of Governors, Federal Reserve Bank presidents/VPs/officers/employees, and Federal Reserve Bank directors).
- 2Amends three sections of the Federal Reserve Act to implement the prohibition:
- 3- For the Board of Governors (12 U.S.C. 241): requires that members may not simultaneously hold any other presidentially appointed office, including during a leave.
- 4- For Federal Reserve Bank presidents, vice presidents, officers, and employees (12 U.S.C. 341): adds a similar prohibition against holding another presidentially appointed office, including during a leave.
- 5- For Federal Reserve Bank boards of directors (12 U.S.C. 302): prohibits simultaneous holding of another presidentially appointed office.
- 6Includes a “Sense of Congress” stating the Fed’s independence is critical, that political interference and conflicts of interest should be avoided, and that dual appointments threaten monetary policy integrity.
- 7The aim is to strengthen the institutional integrity and independence of the Fed by creating a clear separation between political actors and monetary policy decisions.